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A Critique

"Two Levels of History"
W. Lo'IZ

DAVID

r

t is scarcely possible to read a theological
treatise today without at some point
meeting the current distinction between
two levels of history, between His1on, and
Gt1sch;ch1, (following the Bultmannians),
OI between "outer" and "inner" history ( H.
Richard Niebuhr), or between the "objective-historical" and the "existential-historical" ( John Macquarrie) •1 This distinction has primarily been occasioned by the
rise of the historical-critical method in the
19th century, by the failure of the so-called
"quest for the historical Jesus," and by the
church's apologetic needs in the scientific
.("positivistic") era.2 The primary aim of
this paper is critically to examine this distinction, to point out certain difficulties
that beset it, and to suggest a number of
limitations that must be placed on the dis_tinction if it is to .retain its significance. In
the process of criticism the paper will seek
to .rellect some of the concerns manifested
in the contemporary philosophical analysis
of .religious discourse and, for that matter,
1 See Friedrich Goga.nm, D,,,,,1holo,-,.1
tlflll Hu,o,, (London, 1955); H. R. Niebuhr
Tb, M""'inl of Rn,J.lio,, (New York, 1941):
11nd John Macquarrie, As
Th,olo,;
(New York, 1965).

&w,,,,,;.J;s,

in the overarching critique of the whole
theological enterprise per se.
THB DISTJNCI'ION

We may take as .representative of the
distinction between two levels of history
the programmatic monograph of James M.
Robinson, A New Q"esl Hislorical
for 1he
3
Jesus. Robinson herein uaces the failure
of the "old" quest to its one-dimensional
view of history, namely, its emphasis on the
"objective factual level" as the lrtd'j historical. The 19th-century approach to the
person and work of Jesus .reflected the
Rankean goal of presenting history "as it
really happened." Thus in its reaction to
the Christological dogmas pf Orthodoxy,
the old quest sought to apprehend through
~is "objective" methodology the Jesus of
his~ry as He really was, divested of all dogmat1c (and mythological) garb. Viewed
from th~ contemporary perspective, the old
quest failed not only becaue it misjudged
~e nature of its sources ( since the Synopac Gospels a.re themselves "dogmatically"
colored throughout) but especially because
of this defective understanding of history.
In Robinson's words:
We have come to recognize that the objective factual level upon which the nineteenth century operated is only one dimension of history, and that a whole new dimension in the facts, a deeper and more
central plane of meanins, had been largely

Alan Richardson, Christia A1>olo111iu
(London, 1947), employs the so-called "faith
prindple" in historical interpretation u the key
to. Christiaoity'1 self-defense befoie the bu of
2

ICleAce.

bypassed.'

Dnitl W. Lon, 111963 gr1tluu of CoJJeMtlill s.,,.,,,,,.,, St. Lollis, is ,w,11111t, 11 tloctorlll
untlitl.u is bistoriul 1h,olo11 td Unum
Tluologiul Sffll#l/lr1, N1111 Yori Cil1.

1 Studies in Biblical Tbeolo- No 25 (London, 1959).
OU
0

' Ibid., p. 28.
28
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Robinson goes on to summarize this contrast between the two levels of history, and
between two divergent historical methodologies, as follows:
• • . The positivistic understanding of history as consisting of brute facts gave way
to an understanding of history centering in
the profound intentions, stances, and concepts of existence held by persons in the
past, as the well-springs of their outward
actions. Historical methodology shifted
accordingly from a primary concern for
recording the past "wie es eigentlich gewesen," i.e., cataloguing with objective detachment facts in sequence and with proper
causal relationships. Instead, the historian's
task was seen to consist in understanding
those deep-lying intentions of the past, by
involving one's selfhood in an encounter
in which one's own intentions and views
of existence are put in question, and perhaps altered or even radically reversed.15
What concerns the present-day theologian q11a historian, therefore, is not the
"brute facts" of the history of Jesus, but the
"kerygma," that is, the in1e,p,e1111ion of
those facts, the wimess to the past events
of His life- especially His death and
G Ibid., p. 39. It should be carefully noted
that this so-called "new" historical methodology
is in faa that "idealistic" type { via Kant and
Hegel) associated primarily with such historians
as Wilhelm Dilthey, Benedetto Croce, and R.. G.
Collingwood {see pp. 30-31, n. 1, and p. 67,
n. 1). In Th• Philosoph, of Hulor, in Otw
Tim•: An An1holog1 {New York, 1959), editor
Hans Meyerhoff observes that Collingwood, like
Croce, "staked his whole position on the controversial idealistic thesis that written hist0ry
nothing
was
but the present re-enactment, in the
mind of the historian, of past thous}it" {p. 65).
The cue for an "objective" historiography is cogently argued in the essays by Arthur Lovejoy,
Morton White, and Ernst Nasel {Meyerhoff,
pp. 172-215). In any event, "the positivistic
undencanding of bistOry'" ii by .no means 10
passe as Robinson asserts.
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resurrection - understood as "God's aa
calling me to accept my death and receive
resurrected life," with the result that "believing the witness about God's past action
in Christ coincides with the occurrence of
this divine aaion in my present life." 1 It
is precisely in this focus on the kerygma
that the theologian evidences the similar
concern of the modern historian, namely,
with the underlying meaning of history, its
"existential" facets (G1schich1e) rather than
the "brute faets" objectively construed
(Hirlorie). Even so, as Daniel Day Williams has noted, "there can be no doubt
that theologians have found in this distinction between objective faaual knowledge
and personal grasp of meaning a potent
means of saving theology from the disintegrating effect of a narrow and positivistic
historicism. • . • Historical events do not
bestow their ultimate significance upon us
apart from our own personal involvement.""
50MB OUTICISMS

Undoubtedly the current stress on personal involvement in the events of "redemptive history," as opposed to a spirit of
"objective detachment," is absolutely essential to militate against any mere {,Ms
his1orica. In this sense, at least, the distinction between Hislom and GuehidJu
is a modern extension of fundamenal emphases found in the reformers.8 At the
8

Robinson, pp. 42--43.

'l Whlll Pusnl-D"' Th.alogiMu Au Thiding {New York, 1959, rev. ed.), pp. 12,, 127.
I See, for example, Luther's iemarb in TIJ.
Pu,tla• of t1 Chnslitl,, in i.tW, War!r, Vol
31, ed. Harold J. Grimm {Philadelphia, 19,7),
p. 3,7: "I believe that ir has now bec:ome dear
that it ii not enoush or in anJ sense Chriaiall
to p.ieach the wmb, life, and words of Chdsc
as hiltorical faces, u if the Jmowledse of tbae

2
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same time, the distinaion is often made
far too facilely, so that its problematic namre is obscured or even sidestepped altogether. In what follows, we offer several
serious objections to this distinction as it is
presently employed, with particular reference to Robinson and his master Bultmann.
( 1) The inescapable presupposition of
this distinaion is that, i11 a11,y case, one has
to do with certain historical "events," certain "brute facts." To be sure, with regard
to the kerygma concerning Jesus Christ,
they are interpretetl events and facts,
shaped by the cultic needs of the primitive
church. Nonetheless, the claim is being
made that certain happenings have transpired. Robinson, for example, wishes to
stress the "whole new dimension in the
faas," but he therewith concedes that they
remain facts all the same. If the events of
Jesus' life, however, are truly facts, then
they should be open to some manner of
verification or confirmation, in this instance, historical ("objective") confirmation. One cannot protest against this emphasis on personal involvement in such
events as the sine qtia non of a dynamic
faith, but surely it is not mere "objective
detachment" which prompts one to ask
about the namre of the events themselves.
( Indeed, how can I existentially affirm
something-I-know-not-what?)
It would seem, however, that Robinson
would suffice for the conduct of life: yet this is
the fashion among those who must today be
zegarded as our best preachers. • • • Rather
ought Christ to be pieached to the end that
faith in him may be established, that he may
not only be Christ, but be Christ for you aod
me, and that what is said of him and is denoted
in his name may be elfeaual in us." There is

wishes not only to assert a "new dimension"
i11 the facts but to focus so exclusively on
those "profound intentions" at their root
that the facts no longer seem problematic
in any way. Indeed, one even gains the
impression that the "facts" have themselves
been swallowed up, so to speak, by the existential "interpretation," so that the latter
is not just a "commentary" on the facts
but in some real sense even "constitutes"
them. Thus like every Christian theologian,
Robinson necessarily speaks of the death
and resurrection of Christ as the very heart
of the kerygma. Ostensibly two events are
thereby indicated, all the more so when the
essence of faith is said to be "dying and
rising with him." 0 On closer examination,
however, one notes that Robinson speaks
of "God's eschatological action centering in
the saving event of cross and rest1rrection." 10 Apparently Robinson, following
Bultmann, means to speak of Christ's death
(cross) as the sole historical event, which
then holds out for me - when I accept that
death as God's judgment on my life q11a
quest for security- the possibility of a
new life, authentic existence, in short,
resurrection. In other words, the resurrection is something that happens to me
through my personal implication in
another's death, not Christ's literal rising
from the dead but my life-through-Hisdeath ( or the rise of faith in the crucified
One who yet lives for me). Whatever one's
estimate of Robinson's interpretation, it is
scarcely legitimate of him to continue to
speak of Christ's death antl resurrection as
if two separate events were involved in his
personal history. Surely, in the interest of
clarity, Robinson could express himself

little doubt that Bultmann and his disciples
have taken these iemarb with utmost seriousness.
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Robinson, p. 43.

io Ibid., p. 42.
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much more precisely on this all-important
point.11 Such precision is especially imperative today when the problem of the
theologian's specific "meaning" has come
to the fore. The language here is so
slippery that it conceals many ambiguities.
(2) If .the first criticism was basically a
call for clarity, certain other objections have
also been intimated therein. Thus to speak
of any historical e-venl in a straightforward
fashion is at the same time to point to that
event as capable of confirmation or, at
least, to give some indication as to the relative probability of its occurrence. The primary concern here, however, is not to discuss possible modes of verification in the
light of the historical sources, but to question the rationale employed by the Bultmannians for refusing even to consider the
question of verification. Thus, Robinson
asserts:
To require an objective legitimization of
the saving event prior to faith is to take
offence at the offence of Christianity and
to perpetuate the unbelieving ftigbt to security, i.e., the reverse of faith. For faith
involves the rejection of worldly security
as righteousness by works.12
To attempt to build faith on "objective"
history, therefore, is to retreat into carnal
security, to deny justification by faith. The
hearer of the kerygma must not inquire into the factual historicity of the "saving
event" but must allow himself to become
11 Cf. the further statement that the kerygma
is a call to faith "in which God calls me to accept his judgment upon me in Jesus' death, and
to live from his grace in Jesus' resurrection"
( ibid., p. 48). Here rwo specific events in the
history of Jesus are designated. Robinson appropriates Bultmann's language but is not as
forthright in his declaration that the disciples"
faith is the only event of Easter Day.
12 Ibid., p. 44.
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existentially involved in what is being proclaimed.
One pressing question still remains: has
the striving for "factual security" actually
been displaced by this stratagem or simply
,-eplaced by another type, namely, the security of a faith that is unfalsifiable because
the alleged historical events on which it is
based have been reduced to subjective experiences that are in principle irrefutable?
If Christianity wishes to maintain its claim
to uniqueness as a his1orical religion, then
surely it must run the risks of history, that
is, of being proven in error, of holding as
historical what in fact never transpired.11
Indeed, a further question might be put to
the exegetical theologians themselves: if
history (Hisloris) and faith are inimi~
why did the early Christians attempt to
hisloricize their faith? (Cf. the traditions
of the "empty tomb," the resurrection appearances, etc.)
( 3) The previous objection leads directly to another consideration. In discussing the Resurrection, Bultmann ( here
much clearer than Robinson) contends:
The real Easter faith is faith in the word
of preaching which brings illumination.
If the event of Easter day is in any sense
an historical event additional to the event
of the aoss, it is nothing else than the rise
of faith in the risen Lord. . . . The resurrection itself is not an event of past history. . . • B"' lh• hisloneal ,p,oblam is nol
of inltW•sl lo Chrislilm b,lis/ mlhB f"BS#rt"Bclion. For the historical event of the rise
of the Easter-faith means for us what it
meant for the first disciples-namely, the
self-attestation of the risen Lord, the act
1a Thus Ronald Hepburn, in Chapten VI
and VII of his Chris1iai'1 tlllll PMllllk»c (London, 1958), seatehinslY examines this problem
of "'Historicity and Risk" in mncempo.my theology.
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of God in which the redemptive event of
the cross is completed.H
Can the "historical problem" really be dismissed in such summary fashion? For one
thing, why should faith be ;,, an1 sens,
concerned with history? Is it not logically absurd, for example, to hold that
"authentic existence" is possible through
confrontation with a fiaional story? Put
otherwise: how does faith in the crucified
and risen Lord differ from faith in a mythical Christ, if what is primary is my existential involvement, my reception of a new
self-understanding?
Onhodoxy, it may be noted, has tra·
ditionally insisted on the "objectivity" of
the Resurrection ( empty tomb, post-Easter
appearances of the risen Lord attested by
eye-wimesses) because it has also seen in
the Resurrection a significance that tran•
scends the believer's subjective involvement, that is, as the sign of reconciliation
between God and man now complete and
finished apart from my new self-understanding.11 But once the "event of Easter

Day" is claimed to be "nothing else than
the rise of faith in the risen Lord," one
wonders whether this "faith-event" might
not be equally well triggered by a story
that involves a "Christ-idea." Is the "historical Jesus," then, at all requisite for a
living faith? Bultmann's theology, in par-

H "New Testament and MytholoBJ" in
KMJI""' tlllll M11h, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch
(New York, 1961), p. 42 (italics added).
11 This insistence on "objeaivilf'' is by no
means exempt from serious aitldsm. If the
murrection of Jesus, for example, is a strictly
"objective" event, then it most be fashion
approached
in the same
as any other such event, i. e.,
throush the established methods of historicalcridcal srudy. Such srudy entails a number of
presuppositions, includins the so-called "prindple of analog' (all historical events are basically similar inasmuch as they are significantly
condnuous with the conrext in which they occur,
i.e., no event is completely
.
nn gnniJ), and
the "principle of causality" ( any breach of the
causal nexus is a priori excluded, i. e., history is
viewed immanently in terms of the development
of pocentialides, etc.). Furthermore, such stUdy
demands exacting scrutiny of the pertinent teXts
(such u the New Testament accounts of the

Published by Scholarly Resources from Concordia Seminary, 1968

Resurrection), and the acknowledged presence
of rextual ambiguities or contradiaions renders
the actuality of the event problematic to the
extent that such difficulties obtain. Nevertheless,
traditional "supernaturalism" wishes to maintain
a legitimate claim to "historical objeaivity," but
in practice must do so with its hands tied. For
one thing, it denies the applicability of the principles of analogy and causality to the Resurrection but in so doing constantly imposes a severe
strain on its working vocabulary, i. e., it asserts
the historical basis of the Resurreaion and then
proceeds to stretch the received meaning of "history" almost beyond the breaking point; the lat•
ter apparently remains such only in name. In
addition, once the presence of human "interpretation" in the New Testament texts is at all
granted, the door is then opened in principle for
the most radical criticism. Such criticism can be
halted or stifled only on dogmatic grounds or for
ecclesiastical ( or personal) reasons. Thus the
doctrines of verbal, plenary inspiration and Biblical inerrancy appear fundamental to traditional
supernaturalism if the devastating fires of critical study are to be withstood. Such study then
becomes, by definition, "blasphemous." Yet by
such a procedure orthodoxy's claim to historical
objectivity is further undercut, namely, by the
disavowal of a genuine historical criticism. In
summary, it might be said that Bultmann grants
the complete legitimacy of historical-critical investigation and accepts its canons, yet denies that
such study really touches the significance of the
Resurrection; for the latter is not primarily concemed with Jesus of Nazareth but with us. We
have argued that by so doing he in effect surrenders the historical basis of the Christian faith,
passins much too cavalierly from the negative
results of bis own historical criticism to his more
"positive" existentialist interpretation. Orthodoxy, by contrast, affirms the Resurrection's absolute historical grounding but can do so only
bJ arbitrarily redefinins the concept of history,
thus exposing itself to the charge of meaninglessneu, and by denying the applicability of historical-critical
themethods to
Biblical doc:umenu,
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tic:uJar, seems open to the charge of docetism, all the more serious in an era when
theologians are suiving to recover the "true
humanity'" of Christ.
(4) In the passage quoted above, Bultmann also refers to the "self-attestation of
the risen Lord'" as the meaning of the
Easter-faith for us today ( as for the first
disciples). Such a claim apparently represents a further reueat into the security ( ! )
of the nonfalsifiable. The risen Lord attests
Himself through the proclamation of the
Word. Once the hearer has faithfully accepted that Word as a judgment on his life
and a call to decision, he may claim: "Jesus
Christ is indeed risen, since I am conformed to His resurrection ( that is, I possess a new self-understanding through the
Word of the Cross)." Such a claim, however, bears no more attestation than any
similar statement of the "it seems to me'"
variety, that is, it possesses complete psychological certainty but may in fact stem
from delusion or hallucination. Furthetmore, how may the believer now move
from such a statement to an affirmation of
the further claim made by that selfsame
Word: "God, raised Jesus from the dead"?
This latter claim purports to speak of something that lies beyond my experience, something that cannot be totally reduced to exthus removing them from the province of scientific investisatlon. Various contemporary theologians are evidently seeking a point beyond the
His1oria-G•schi&hz. dialectic in speaking of the
Resurrection as history, that is, they desire a view
of history shaped from "within,'" so to speak, by
the Resurrection itself. See Walter Kiinnerh,
Th•olog7 of lh• R•sN"•elion (St. Louis, 1966),
and Richard R. Niebuhr, R.s""•etion t111tl Hisloriul R•m°" (New York, 1957). Kiinnerh's
book opposes both Bultmaonian exiStentialism
and traditional supernaturalism without recourse
to the doctrines of verbal inspiration or Scriptural inerrancy.
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istential significance. Surely the latter
claim cannot participate in the "self-authenticating" nature of the former without
confusing the two levels of use. The "selfattestation of the risen Lord" may thus
afford absolute psychological certainty but
says nothing about what is the case. Nor
can such self-attestation really be a "rislt'
since it is not open to refutation. It seems
passing strange, therefore, when Bultmann
insists that "it is precisely immunity from
proof which secures the Christian proclamation against the charge of being mythological." 16 But to be immune from proof
is also to be compatible with any state of
affairs, even with the "mythological"!
SoMB SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The distinction between the "objecdvehistorical" and the "existential-historical" is
a useful and meaningful one within certain
bounds. Basically it asserts that theologial
talk about history is qualitatively different
from scientific concerns with history.
Whereas the historian f/1111 scientist is concerned with marshalling the facts and seeks
to control unwarranted intrusion of personal interests, the theologian f/1111 historian
is concerned with history as the sphere of
God's revelation ,pro nobis and therefore
preeminently with personal involvement in
the events of the past. But in the process
of making this distinction, several dangers
must be recognized and gua.tded against.
( 1) The distinction between the tw0
levels of history must be so presented as to
make clear that the difference is not between the "objective" and the "subjective,"
but between the "neutral" and the "personal." In other words, the theologian is
( or should be) very much inierested in
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what really happened, albeit his interest "offense of Christianity" is also the offense
springs from involvement rather than de- of claiming that God has m ade H imself
tachment. As a historian, bow could the signally known in the personal history of
theologian's true concern be any other than this one Man, Jesus Christ. To affirm such
with the facts? The "ultimate significance" a claim is to run the risk of being shown in
of any event may not be disclosed without error, that is, that this Jesus was not at all
personal involvement, but if that event what Christians have made Him out to be.
never occurred ( or was substantially difThe risk of history and the scandal of
ferent than asserted to be ) , such involve- particularity, therefore, also imply that a
ment would be but a particularly treach- man may finally decide tO reject the G ospel
erous form of self-delusion. Therefore the not solely because he refuses to place his
theologian must always attempt to discover, life under the divine judgment ( a sin of
as far as possible, the "brute facts." Thus pride) but equally well because for him
in reopening the quest for the historical the historical evidence is m uch too flimsy
Jesus, the disciples of Bultmann have to bear the weigh ty su perstrucrure that
shown themselves aware that their teacher's Christianity has erected on it. Bultmann
flight from Historie threatens to end up wishes to dispense with the sacri fimci11,inprecisely in the realm of the "mythological,"
tellectt1, entailed by the "outmoded" ( or
s
which be so strenuously decries, unless the presciemific) aspects of Christian thought,
"kerygmatic Christ" be shown to have His but he seems to demand in turn a sacrilegitimate source in the "historical Jesus." 17cittmfi i
ntellect11,s with regard tO the his( 2) Robinson and Bultmann both op- torical underpinnings of the Gospel. He
pose "objectification" in the name of the makes strictly an issue of faith what is also
risk of faith and the scandal of the Gospel. a problem of knowledge.
Without a doubt faith is not "sight" and
( 3) Concerning the R esurrection, Bultthe faith-filled hearing of the Gospel re- mann rightly insists that one could have
quires the acceptance of God's judgment all the "facts" - be assured by some indison the whole of one's life. But Christianity, putable proof of the resuscitation of a
it must be further asserted, entails several corpse-and still miss completely the sigrisks and scandals. In addition to the ex- nificance of Christ's resurrection. Decision
istential risk of giving allegiance to One and commitment are called for. There
who was crucified and the scandal of allow- might be an empty tomb without in any
ing one's "natural" life to be judged as in- way a "Resurrection" in the Christian
authentic, there is also the risk of history sense. In the New Testament itself the
and the scandal of particularity. The meaning of the Resurrection is inextricably
bound up with the sense of the ongoing
17 See the essays by Ernst Kasemann, "The
Problem of the Historical Jesus," in Essays on and immediate presence of the risen Christ
New
(Naperville, Ill., 1964), as the Lord of life. As Ian Ramsey would
Testament Themes
pp. 15--47; Ernst Fuchs, "The Quest of the Historical Jesus," in Studies of the Hi1torical Je1u1 put it, the Resurrection is "spatio-temporal
(Naperville, Ill., 1964) , pp. 11-31; and Ger- and more." 18 Granted, but then it is
hard Ebeling, "The Question of the Historical
Jesus and the Problem of Christology," in Word
tlfld Paith (Philadelphia, 1963), pp. 288-304.
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p. 149.
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spatio-temporal at least, since it is not an
idea but an event. What is that event?
Bultmann answers that the only historical
event of Easter Day is the disciples' faith.
If that be the case, however, then it must
be made abundantly clear that when one
accepts the Resurrection, he is accepting
the church's faith in the disciples' faith in
the Resurrection, that is, his is a faith in
faith ( for he is not saying anything about
Jesus) . And to designate the Resurrection
an "act of God," therefore, is to say at most
that God awakens faith, not that He raised
Jesus from the dead. Bue now, when seen
in this light, theology's recurrent talk about
the "mighty aces of God" is really not language about God's doing something in
history but about His doing something to
me, His acting in my inner life.10
At this point, I think, it is possible to
recognize how radically Bultmann has departed from the claim that Christianity is
a historical religion.2 For it is logically im-

°

19 Cf. Langdon Gilkey, "Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language," in
Journal of Religion, XLI (1961), 194-205;
and James Barr, "Revelation Through History
in the Old Testament and in Modern Theology,"
in New Theology No. 1, ed. Martin Marty and
Dean Peerman (New York, 1964), pp. 60-74.

Cf. the remark of Helmut Thielicke in
"The Restatement of New Testament Mythology," in Bartsch, p. 147: "The historical narratives of the N ew Testament are, to put it
bluntly, not events in their own right, but only
20
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possible to derive propositions about God's
acting in history from existential claims to
the effect that He has acted in my life. The
problem is one of priorities. If God acted
once for all in Jesus Christ, He may yet aa
for me today ( through the Word about
His action in Christ) . Bue His acting for
me can never become His acting once for
all in Jesus Christ, and this latter claim is
the fundamental tenet of Christian belief.
What ostensibly began, therefore, as a distinction between "brute facts" and the apprehension of a "deeper and more central
plane of meaning" within the faces has
ended up with the existential meaning
alone. The distinction is useful to bring
our the "new dimensions" in the historical,
bur when it simply transforms the historical into the psychological ( or experiential) it has abandoned the historical
grounding of the Christian faith.
In summary: the problem is to maintain
a distinction between the "neutral" and
"personal" levels of hiscory without falling
into pure subjectivism. It would appear
that this is one of the most pressing theological tasks of the present, at least for all
those who wish to make such a distinction
at all.
New York, New York
the prelude to an event. The real event is the
change which takes place in human self-consciousness."
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